# CONCLUSIONS FOR THE STRUCTURE OF CULTURAL EXPERIENCES

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*Abstract*

*Cultural productions are powerful agents in defining the scope, force and direction of a civilization. It is only in the cultural experience that the data are organized to generate specific feelings and beliefs. Cultural experiences, then, are the opposite of scientific experiments-opposite in the sense of being mirror images of each other. Scientific experiments are designed to control bias, especially that produced by human beings, out of the result, but cultural experiences are designed to build it in. The attitudes, beliefs, opinions and values studied by sociologists are the residues of cultural experiences, separated from their original contexts and decaying (perhaps in the sense of "fermenting") in the minds of individuals.*

*On the other hand, leisure is constructed from cultural experiences. Leisure and culture continue to exist at a slight remove from the world of work and everyday life. They are concentrated in vacations, amusements, games, play, and religious observances.*

*Key words: Culture experiences, cultural productions*

## Introduction - Cultural Experiences

A subclass of experiences are the *cultural experiences*. The data of cultural experiences are somewhat fictionalized, idealized or exaggerated models of social life that are in the public domain, in film, fiction, political rhetoric, small talk, comic strips, expositions, etiquette and spectacles. All tourist attractions are cultural experiences. A cultural experience has two basic parts which must be combined in order for the experience to occur. The first part is the representation of an aspect of life on stage, film, etc. I call this part the *model*, using the term to mean an embodied ideal, very much the same way it is used in the phrase "fashion model." Or, as Goffman has written, "a model for, not a model of." The second part of the experience is the changed, created, intensified belief or feeling that is based on the model. This second part of the experience I call the *influence*. The spectacle of an automobile race is a model; the thrills it provides spectators and their practice of wearing patches and overalls advertising racing tires and oils are its influence.

A *medium* is an agency that connects a model and its influence. A social situation of face-to-face interaction, a gathering, is a medium, and so are radio, television, film and tape. The media are accomplices in the construction of cultural experiences, but the moral structure of the medium is such that it takes the stance of being neutral or disinterested[1] (Marshall Mc, 1964). Models for individual "personality," fashion and behavior are conveyed in motion pictures, for example, but if there is any suspicion that mannerisms, affectations, clothing or other artifacts were put before the audience for the purpose of initiating a commercially exploitable fad, the fad will fail. It is a mark of adulthood in modern society that the individual is supposed to be able to see through such tricks. Whatever the facts in the case, the medium must appear to be disinterested if it is to be

influential, so that any influence that flows from the model can appear to be both spontaneous and based on genuine feelings. High-pressure appeal in children's advertising on television permits parents to teach their children about these delicate matters, another kind of childhood immunization.

Extending conventional usage somewhat, I will term a cultural model, its influence(s), the medium that links them, the audiences that form around them, and the producers, directors, actors, agents, technicians, and distributors that stand behind them, a *production*. Cultural productions so defined include a wide range of phenomena. Perhaps the smallest are advertising photographs of a small "slice" of life: for example, of "the little woman" at the front door meeting her "man" home from the "rat race" and proffering his martini. The largest cultural productions are the summer-long and year-long festivals that tie up the entire life of a community, even a nation, as occurs in international expositions and centennials. Cultural productions of the middle range include big games, parades, moon shots, mass protests, Christmas, historical monuments, opening nights, elections and rock music festivals[2] (Howard Becker, 1974). It can be noted that the owners of the means of *these* productions are not as yet organized into a historically distinct class, but it is becoming clear that *governments* at all levels and all types are becoming increasingly interested in controlling cultural production.

Attending to cultural *productions* avoids, I thing, some of the problems we encounter when dealing with the concept of culture. When we talk in terms of *a culture*, we automatically suggest the possibility of *a consensus*. Then, anyone who wishes to point out internal differences in society undercuts the validity of the analysis. This is a good way of perpetuating an academic field, but not a very good approach to society. To suggest, in the first place, that culture rests on a consensus reveals, it seems to me, a profound misunderstanding of culture and society. Social structure is differentiation. Consensus is a form of death at the group level. All cultures are a series of models of life. These models are organized in multiples according to every known logical principle, and some that are, so far, unknown: similitude, opposition, contradiction, complement, parallel, analogy. There has never been a cultural totality. Lévi-Strauss has mistakenly attributed totality to primitive cultures to contrast them to our own[3] (S. O. Paul, and R. A. Paul, 1967). Primitive cultures achieve the semblance of totality by their small size, acceptance on the part of the entire group of a relatively few models and their isolation. But this "totality" results from demographic and historical accidents, not from any quality of culture itself.

This approach to culture permits the student of society to search for the explanation and logic of his subject in the subject itself, that is, to substitute cultural models for the intellectual and ideologically biased models of sociological theory. Cultural models are "ideal" only from the standpoint of everyday life. They are not ideal form the standpoint of any absolute such as a religion, a philosophy or sociology. There is no "mother" representation, itself inaccessible, behind all the others copied from it. Each production is assembled from available cultural elements and it remains somewhat faithful to the other cultural models for the same experience.

Cultural productions then are *signs*. Like the faces of Jesus Christ on religious calendars, they refer to (resemble) each other but not the original. Cultural productions are also *rituals*. They are rituals in the sense that they are based on formulae or models and in the sense that they carry individuals beyond themselves and the restrictions of everyday experience. Participation in a cultural production, even at the level of being influenced by it, can carry the individual to the frontiers of his being where his emotions may enter into communion with the emotions of others "under the influence"[4]

In modern societies, the more complex cultural production are understood to be divided into type such as world's fairs, epic motion pictures, moon shots, scandals, etc. Each example of a type is located in a specific relationship to its forebears. A collective consciousness relates the bicentennial to the centennial, Watergate to Teapot Dome, *Around the World in Eighty Days to*

*Potemkin*, if not always in the experience phase, at least at the level of production. Each genre of production is constructed from basically the same set of cultural elements, but precise arrangement varies from production to production or the result is perceived as "dated," a "copy," "rerun," "spinoff" or a "poor man's version" of an original. The space race petered out from the lack of significant variation on the themes of "countdown," "launching" and "moon landing"[5]. Of course, once a type of cultural production has died out, it can be revived by a clever copy which is said to be a remake of a "classic." Perhaps on the centennial of man's first trip to the moon, we will send a party up in old-fashioned equipment as a kind of celebration.

The system of cultural production is so organized that any given production automatically serves one of two essential functions: (1) it may add to the ballast of our modern civilization by sanctifying an *original* as being a model worthy of copy or an important milestone in our development, or (2) it may establish a new direction, break new ground, or otherwise contribute to the progress of modernity by presenting new combinations of cultural elements and working out the logic of their relationship. This second, differentiating, function of cultural productions dominates the other in modern society and is at the heart of the process that is called "modernization" or "economic development and cultural change." Modern international mass tourism produces in the minds of the tourists juxtapositions of elements from historically separated cultures and thereby speeds up the differentiation and modernization of middle-class consciousness.

Even though a given "experience" (in the less restricted sense of the term) may not be influenced by a cultural model, there are usually several models available for it. For example, one might have a drug experience, a sex experience-some might even go so far as to claim a religious experience-seemingly independent of cultural models and influences. On the other hand, many recipes for very similar kinds of experiences originate on a cultural level. The cultural models are attractive in that they usually contain claims of moral, esthetic and psychological superiority over the idiosyncratic version. The discipline and resources required to organize sexual activities on the model provided by pornographic motion pictures exceed that required by mere individualistic sexual expression. And the cultural version promises greater pleasure to those who would follow it.

Cultural production, then, are not merely repositories of models for social life; they organize the attitudes we have toward the models and life. *Instant replay* in televised professional sports provides an illustration. The "play" occurs and the sportscaster intervenes (his role similar to that of the priest) to tell the audience what is important about what has happened, what to look for, what to experience. Then, instant replay delivers the exemplar, the model, slowed down, even stopped, so it can be savored. From the stream of action, select bits are framed in this way as cultural experiences.

The structure of cultural production is adapted to the cultivation of values even on the frontiers where society encounters its own evil and error or undergoes change. The official model of the "drug experience," which moralizes against the use of marijuana, speed, or LSD, nevertheless subversively represents the experience as a powerfully seductive force, so desirable that it is impossible for an individual to resist it on his own without terrifying counter magic. The "uplifting" experience which restores conventional morality can arise from the dramatic representation of the darkest and most threatening of crimes. Christianity stretched the dramatic possibilities here to the limit, perhaps, as Nietzsche suggested, beyond the limit.

Cultural experiences are valued in-themselves and are the ultimate deposit of values, including economic values, in modern society. The value of the labor of a professional football player, for example, is determined by the amount of his playing time that is selected out for instant replay, that is, by the degree to which his work contributes to a cultural production and becomes

integral with our modern cultural experience. Motion picture stars were the first to cash in on this structure, the "romantic experience" being among the first to undergo modernization.

Workers of the traditional industrial type are crowed on the margins of the modern economy where there is no relationship between their standard of living and the importance of the work they do. Food producers and field hands are among the lowest-paid workers, while energy producers like coal miners are among our most cruelly treated. The organization of labor into unions serves mainly as an ongoing dramatization of labor of what our collective minimal standards are for the respectable poor. Recently, there have been some bright spots within this bleak panorama, labor movements that seem to have a "natural" understanding of the importance of articulating their programs to the society via cultural productions. Important among these has been Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers with its coordination of unorthodox tactics, including hunger strikes, consumer boycotts and the development and wide promulgation of symbolism for the struggle: the Thunderbird buttons, postcards, etc. Criteria for the success of this movement emerge from an entirely cultural model, involving not merely a mobilization of the workers but of segments of the society socially and geographically distant from the fields and vineyards. Not unexpectedly, this movement (which will be a model for future struggles) faced as much opposition from labor already organized in an industrial framework as it has from the fruit growers.

The economics of cultural production is fundamentally different from that of industrial production. In the place of exploited labor, we find exploited leisure. Unlike industry, the important profits are not made in the production process, but by fringe entrepreneurs, businesses on the edge of the actual production. These can be arranged on a continuum from popcorn and souvenir sales through booking agents and tour agents to the operations that deal in motion picture rights or closed-circuit television hook-ups. The focal point of such action is a cultural production that almost magically generates capital continuously, often without consuming any energy for itself. Greek ruins are an example. Festivals and conventions organize the economic life of entire cities around cultural productions.

On a national level, economic development is linked to the export of cultural products for sale to other countries. The Beatles received the O.B.E. not so much because the Crown liked their music as because their international record sales arrested the disastrous growth of the trade deficit in Great Britain at the time. Underdeveloped countries can "export" their culture without having to package it just by attracting tourists. The foreign consumer journeys to the source. Developed economies pioneer these complex cultural arrangements by experimenting on their own populations: "See America First."

## Cultural Productions and Social Groups

Cultural productions are powerful agents in defining the scope, force and direction of a civilization. It is only in the cultural experience that the data are organized to generate specific feelings and beliefs. Cultural experiences, then, are the opposite of scientific experiments-opposite in the sense of being mirror images of each other. Scientific experiments are designed to control bias, especially that produced by human beings, out of the result, but cultural experiences are designed to build it in. The attitudes, beliefs, opinions and values studied by sociologists are the residues of cultural experiences, separated from their original contexts and decaying (perhaps in the sense of "fermenting") in the minds of individuals.

With the exception of those involved in ethnic studies, where the relationship is obvious, I think sociologists are not attentive enough to the importance of cultural productions in the determination of the groups they study. For example, generational groups are determined by the deferent influences of rock music and hip fashion, and "bridging the generation gap" usually

means an older person has experienced a rock music concert or smoked marijuana[6] (Alison Lurie, 1974). The mechanics of group formation are nicely simplified when cultural productions mediate in-group/out-group distinctions. Almost everyone has had the experience of attending a show with a group and on the way home dividing into subgroups on the basis of being differently influenced by it. When people are getting to know each other (a distinctively modern routine), they will compare the way they feel about several cultural models (Joe Namath, the "California Life-Style," a famous trial, the attitude of Parisians toward tourists, etc.) and move closer together of further away from a relationship on the basis of their mutual understanding of these matters.

In the early 1960's, I observed a group of people at Berkeley who had seen the motion picture *One Eyed Jacks* so many times that they knew every line by heart (e.g., "Git over here, you big tub of guts") and they "did" the entire picture from beginning to end around a table at a coffee house. This, of course, represents a kind of high of culturally based togetherness. Some groups were formed in this way over the teachings of Jesus. In a shining example of modern self-consciousness, the Beatles were reported to have remarked, "We're more popular than Jesus now."

It has been a sociological truism that a human group that persists for any length of time will develop a "world view," a comprehensive scheme in which all familiar elements have a proper place. I am not certain that any group ever operated like this. Radical group that meet periodically to try to hammer together an alternate view-point seem to drift aimlessly without dramatic ups and downs. This stands in marked contrast to the impact of their cultural productions, their mass protest demonstrations which shock the national consciousness. I am quite certain that if the idea that "a group develops a world view" holds a grain of truth, modernity reverses the relationship or inverts the structure. Modernized peoples, released from primary family and ethnic group responsibilities, organize themselves in groups around world views provided by cultural productions. The group does not produce the world view, the world view produces the group. A recent example is the Oriental guru phenomenon: visitors from afar promulgating a global vision in elaborately staged rallies surround themselves with devotees for the duration of their presence. Rock musicians' "groupies" and tour groups are other examples.

In industrial society, refinement of a "life-style" occurs through a process of emulating elites, or at least of keeping up with the Joneses. This requires designated leaders, so followers can know whom to obey, and regular meetings: church meetings, town meetings, board meetings, faculty meetings. The requisite of an internal group order, with its meetings of elites and followers, is disappearing with the coming of modernity. Life-styles are not expanded via emulation of socially important others until they have taken over an entire group. They are expanded by the reproduction of cultural models, a process that need not fit itself into existing group boundaries. The aborigines living near the missions in the Australian Outback have adopted a modified "Beach boy" look and play Hawaiian-style popular ballads on guitars[7.] The modern world is composed of movements and life-styles that exhibit neither "leadership" not "organization" in the sense that these terms are now used by sociologists. World views and life-styles emerge from and dissolve into cultural productions.

From the standpoint of each cultural production (the screening of *Love Story*, for example, or a televised "super Bowl" game), any population can be divided into three groups: (1) those who would not attend; (2) those who would attend: of those who would attend, there are (2a) those who would get caught up in the action and go along with it to its moral and aesthetic conclusion, and (2b) those who would reject the model, using their experience as a basis for criticizing such "trash," "violence" or "fraud." In this last group are the American tourists who go to Russia in order to strengthen the credibility of their anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet proclamations.

It is noteworthy that recent trends in Western cultural production have been aimed at transforming the negative, critical audience into one that is "taken in" by the show. Recent fine art knows full well that it will be called "trash," and some of it does little to prevent the formation of

this opinion: consider the display of ripe trash cans in art museums. Andy Warhol named one of his cinematic productions *Trash*. The effort here is basically democratic, to reach everyone with art, the detractors and the appreciators (who think of themselves as being "in" on the "put on") alike. Some of Frank Zappa's music could also serve as illustration.

Culture can continue, via its productions, to provide a basis for community even in our complex modern society. In fact, it is only culture-not empirical social relations-that can provide a basis for the modern community. Working through cultural productions, people can communicate emotions and complex meanings across class, group and generational lines. Music and games, for example, have always had deep roots in the human community because they permit anyone who knows the basic code to enjoy nuances and subtleties in the playing out of variations. Strangers who have the same cultural grounding can come together in a cultural production, each knowing what to expect next, and feel a closeness or solidarity, even where no empirical closeness exists. Their relationship begins before they meet. In modern society, not merely music and games but almost every aspect of life can be played at, danced, orchestrated, made into a model of itself and perpetuated without leadership and without requiring anyone's awareness or guidance.

As cultural productions provide a base for the modern community, they give rise to a modern form of alienation of individuals interested only in the model or the life-style, not in the life it represents. The academic provides some nice examples. Education in the modern world is increasingly represented as a form of recreation: suburban housewives vacillate between joining a reducing "spa" and taking a class at the university. Our collective image of the "college experience" emphasizes the swirling ambiance of the campus life-style, the intensity of the "rap sessions," the intimacy of even fleeting relationships between "college friends," "college pals" and "college buddies." The educational experience holds out the possibility of conversation, possibly sex, even friendship, with a "star" professor. The growth of the mind that is supposed to be the result of education can be exchanged for the attitudes that support the growth, an acceptance of change, an attachment to the temporary and a denial of comfort. A willingness, even a desire, to live in semi furnished quarters, moving often like a fugitive, holds the academic in its grip as an emblem at the level of an entire life-style of a restless spirit. There is an available esthetic of all aspects of the dark side of the college experience wherein, for example, the exhaustion of staying up all night, smoking, drinking coffee and studying for an examination with a friend is represented as a kind of "high" and, while painful at the moment, an alleged source of exquisite memories.

What I have described so far is the *model* of the educational experience found in cultural productions. No one need actually conform to it. The image of the tweedy, dry, humors less, conservative, absent-minded, pipe-sucking professor from the industrial age is being replaced by another image: that of a swinging, activist, longhaired, radical modern professor. But one finds in the *real* academic milieu some students and professors who embrace this life-style, who seem to have been attracted to their calling because they like the way it *appears* in our collective versions of it, and they want to make others see them as they see their ideal counterparts in the model.

In this academic group we find highly cultivated diversions, innocent copies of the serious aspects of scholarship. I have observed a party at which wine was served from numbered but otherwise unmarked bottles. The party was a little test. The celebrants carried cards and were supposed to indicate the house and vintage of each wine to win a prize for the most correct answers. On another occasion, a picnic, all the revelers got themselves up in full medieval drag, played on lutes and ate roast goat-theirs being a historical experience, one department the college experience. For those who are in it for this kind of action, the university is less an house of knowledge than a fountain of youths.

Max Weber, consolidating his powerful comprehension of industrial society and looking ahead, perhaps to the present day, warned: "No one knows yet who will inhabit this shell [of industrial capitalism] in the future: whether at the end of its prodigious development there will be

new prophets or a vigorous renaissance of all thoughts and ideals or whether finally, if none of this occurs, mechanism will produce only petrifaction hidden under a kind of anxious importance. According to this particular development of culture. Specialists without spirit, libertines without heart, this nothingness imagines itself to be elevated to a level of humanity never before attained"[8] (Max Weber, 1922).

This mentality that Weber anticipated with great clarity and precision has become more of less "offical" in political and bureaucratic circles, among 'the last men of his particular development of culture." While it continues to inhabit traditional fortresses of power, it is also clear that an alternate, postindustrial kind of mind is beginning to emerge in the interstices of modern culture.

Lewis Mumford discerned a dimension of this mind in the figure of Albert Schweitzer: "In philosophy or theology, in medicine or in music, Schweitzer's talents were sufficient to guarantee him a career of distinction: as one of the eminent specialists of his time, in any of these departments, his success would have been prompt and profitable, just to the extent that he allowed himself to be absorbed in a single activity. But in order to remain a whole man, Schweitzer committed the typical act of sacrifice for the coming age: *be deliberately reduced the intensive cultivation of any one field, in order to expand the contents and significance of his life as a whole* ….yet the result of that sacrifice was not the negation to his life but its fullest realization…"[9]

This emerging modern mind is bent on expanding its repertoire of experiences, and on an avoidance of any specialization that threatens to interrupt the search for alternatives and novelty. (This can be contrasted with the mind of industrial man, being in certain of its particulars a reaction against specialized and linear industrial processes.) *Tradition* remains embedded in modernity but in a position of servitude: tradition is there to be recalled to satisfy nostalgic whims or to provide coloration or perhaps a sense of profundity for a modern theme. There is an urgent cultivation of new people, new groups, new things, new ideas, and hostility to repetition: a built-in principle of escalation in every collective work from war to music. There is a desire for greatly expanded horizons, a search for the frontiers of even such familiar matters as domestic relations. Finally, there is everywhere, including in our sociology, a repressive encircling urge, movement or idea that everyone ought to be coming together in a modern moral consensus.

## The Work Experience

*Leisure* is constructed from cultural experiences. Leisure and culture continue to exist at a slight remove from the world of work and everyday life. They are concentrated in vacations, amusements, games, play, and religious observances. This ritual removal of culture from workaday activities has produced the central crisis of industrial society. In a fine early essay on "Culture, Genuine and Spurious" [1924], which, though available, has received too little attention in the human sciences, the linguist Edward Sapir wrote: "The great cultural fallacy of industrialism, as developed up to the present time, is that in harnessing machines to our uses it has not known how to avoid the harnessing the majority of mankind to its machines. The telephone girl who lends her capacities, during the greater part of the living day, to the manipulation of a technical routine that has an eventually high efficiency value but that answers to no spiritual needs of her own is an appalling sacrifice to civilization. As a solution to the problem of culture she is a failure-the more dismal the greater her natural endowment"[10]. (Edward Sapir, 1961)

The mechanization Sapir stresses is only a part of the problem. Industrial society elevates work of all kinds to an unprecedented level of social importance, using as its techniques the rationalization and the deculturization of the workplace. As this new kind of rationalized work got almost everyone into its iron grip, culture did not enter the factories, offices and workshops. The workaday world is composed of naked and schematic social relations determined by raw power, a

kind of adolescent concern for "status" and a furtive, slick sensualism all cloaked in moralistic rhetoric. Culture grew and differentiated as never before, escaping the elite groups that had previously monopolized it. It became popular, but it receded ever further from the workaday world.

Modern social movements push work and its organization to the negative margins of existence, and as our society follows these movements ever deeper into postindustrial modernity, the more widespread becomes the idea that not merely play and games but life itself is supposed to be fun. The world of work has not mounted a counteroffensive. It responds by shriveling up, offering workers ever increasing freedom from its constraints. I am suggesting that the old sociology cannot make much sense out of this if it stays behind studying work arrangements, class, status, power and related sociological antiquities.

Industrial society bound men to its jobs, but because of the extreme specialization and fragmentation of tasks in the industrial process, the job did not function to integrate its holder into a synthetic social perspective, a world view. As a solution to the problem of culture, industrial work is a failure. It repulses the individual, sending him away to search for his identity or soul in off-the-job activities: in music, sports, church, political scandal and other collective diversions. Among these diversions is found a cultural production of a curious and special kind marking the death of industrial society and the beginning of modernity: a museumization of work and work relations, a cultural production I call a *work display.*

Examples of work displays include guided tours of banks, the telephone company, industrial plants; the representation of cowboys and construction workers in cigarette advertisements; the chapters of *Moby Dick* on whaling, etc. Both machine and human work can be displaced into and displayed as a finished product: a work. Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River in Washington State is the greatest work display of all, both in the sense of the work it does while the tourist is looking on, and in its being a product of a mighty human labor. (Grand Coulee is also fittingly the tomb of some workers who fell in while pouring its concrete.) Labor transforms raw material into useful objects. Modernity is transforming labor into cultural productions attended by tourists and sightseers who are moved by the universality of work relations-*not* as this is represented through their own work (from which they are alienated), but as it is revealed to them at their leisure through the displayed work of others. Industrial elites were inarticulate when asked to explain the place and meaning of work, responding only with an abstraction: Today, the meaning of work of all types is being established in cultural productions.

Marx foresaw a clean division of capitalist society with workers on one side and owners on the other and an inevitable showdown with a classless aftermath. As industrial society developed, however, the work/no work division did not eventually reside in neatly defined and socially important classes. In prerevolutionary societies such as our own, there are sub proletarian "leisure" classes of idlers and the aged. And one by-product of the worker revolutions around the world is the creation of a sterile international class of displaced monarchs, barons and ex-puppet dictators, numerically unimportant but a visible cultural element, nevertheless: they are called jet setters and Beautiful People.

The "class struggle," instead of operating at the level of history, is operating at the level of workaday life and its opposition to culture. In the place of the division Marx foresaw is and arrangement wherein workers are displayed, and other workers of the other side of the culture barrier watch them for their enjoyment. Modernity is breaking up the "leisure class," capturing its fragments and distributing them to everyone. Work in the modern world does not turn class against class so much as it turns man against himself, fundamentally dividing his existence. The modern individual, if he is to appear to be human, is forced to forge his own syntheses between his work and his culture.

**References**

➢ Marshall Mc *Luhan* has argued, and gained much agreement, that the media are entirely responsible for the construction of cultural images. This radical position probably accords the media too much primacy and independence. See popular *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

➢ Howard Becker has published an article, "Art as Collective Action, ''*American Sociological Review 39,* no.6 (December 1974, pp.767-76, in which he makes the point that many individuals cooperate to produce culture. He does not treat art and other cultural productions as models for the organization of our modern society and experience. His sociology remains centered on the individual even after the discussion of «cooperation» and the like. Erving Goffman has opened the door to understanding the structure of modern society with his dramaturgical studies of modern life, but he arbitrarily restricts his analysis to the individual and situational level. Goffman uses cultural models (dramatic devices, social fictions, etiquette) as his tools-he does not treat them as part of his subject matter. For example, in somewhat overstated disclaimer, Goffman writes: «I make no claim whatsoever to be talking about the core matters of sociology –social organization  and structure….I personally hold society to be first in every way and any individual's current involvements to be second; this report deals only with matters that are second.» *Frame Analysis,* p.13.

➢ See *Leçon Inaugurale* published in English as *The Scope of Anthropology,* trans. S. O. Paul and R. A. Paul (London: Cape, 1967).

➢ It can be noted that electronically mediated experience is de-ritualized to some degree. As compared to *live experience*, electronically mediated experiences separate the performers from the audience and the members of the audience from each other. Because the audience need not get itself "up" for the experience, it can avoid taking a role in the experience, and if the media lull their audience to sleep in this way, they cannot play an important part in the emergence of modern civilization. There are signs that television is retreating into a position fully subordinate to everyday life, a kind of self-censuring "Muzak" background noise for domestic settings: the "talk shows" only go so far as to bring the living room into the living room; "soaps" bring the kitchen into the kitchen.

➢ Suggested by Virginia McCloskey, who attributes the remark on the moon landing to Margaret Mead.

➢ The philandering professor anti-hero in Alison Lurie's novel, *The War Between the Tates* (New York: Random House, 1974), tried to bridge the gap to his graduate- student girlfriend in this way.

➢ Reported to me by Barry Alpher, who has done linguistic fieldwork among the Australians.

➢ Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsatz zur Wissenschaftslehre.* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1922),p. 204.Cited in Merleau - Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception,* ed. J. M. Edie ( Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 205. This passage also appears, translated somewhat differently, in Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans.* Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribner's, 1958), p. 209.

➢ Lewis Mumford, *The Conduct of Life* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p.209.

➢ Edward Sapir, *Culture, Language, and Personality,* ed. D.G. Mandelbaum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p.92.